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Constructing Africa: Chinese
Investment, Infrastructure Deficits,
and Development
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa†
Despite recent trends towards robust economic growth in many SubSaharan African countries, a number of challenges remain, including those
emerging from persistent infrastructure deficits. China has emerged as a
key partner to a number of African countries, including in financing and
constructing large-scale infrastructure projects. China has become the
dominant trading partner with Africa today, with bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) growing fourfold between 2001 and 2005.
Relationships between China and African countries unfold in a context
shaped by histories of relationships between African countries and external parties, particularly European former colonial powers, which have far
too often been exploitative and unequal. These past interactions have been
key elements in the construction of African infrastructure and institutions.
Processes of construction of infrastructures in Africa, including institutions and a wide range of physical infrastructures, have been fundamentally incomplete in important respects, which has contributed to persistent
poverty and instability in a number of African countries. As a result of
past experiences, contemporary relationships between African countries
and China are filtered through lenses shaped by past experience. The
extent to which relationships with China will enable the development of
more complete infrastructure construction in Africa is not yet fully apparent. The lessons of history, however, suggest that attention must be paid to
processes of both deconstruction and construction that accompany external relationships, be they with China or other external powers.
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Introduction
In the early days of the twenty-first century, the seemingly robust economic prospects of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa drew global attention.1
Some projections suggested that African countries would constitute a
majority of the top ten countries in the world in terms of economic
growth.2 Economic growth projections in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries were considered as broad-based and evident in a number of
sectors, including natural resources, land, agriculture, transport, manufacturing, financial intermediation, and tourism.3
Robust economic growth statistics have led some to predict a potentially rosy economic future for the continent.4 Indeed, recent economic
growth statistics suggest that at least some negative post-colonial economic
trends may be shifting.5 Although early twenty-first century economic
growth has been driven to a significant degree by increases in commodity
prices, this growth also reflects trends in Sub-Saharan Africa that are likely
1. IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2013: HOPE, REALITIES, RISKS 67– 69
(2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01; CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL.,
LIONS ON THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 1 (2010), http:/
/www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Re
search/Productivity%20Competitiveness%20and%20Growth/Lions%20on%20the%20
move%20The%20progress%20of%20African%20economies/MGI_Lions_on_the_move_
african_economies_full_report.ashx.
2. The Lion Kings?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.economist.com/
node/17853324.
3. This information is from McKinsey and reflects economic drivers for the fifteen
countries in Africa that constitute eighty percent of African GDP. ROXBURGH, supra note
1, at 2.
4. The Lion Kings?, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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to be sustainable, at least in part.6 These trends include growing urban
middle class populations, as well as macroeconomic and other government
policy changes that have promoted growth.7 In that sense, recent SubSaharan African economic growth figures underscore ways that changing
policies can yield discernible results.8
At the same time, an economic slowdown in many African countries
in 2015 and 2016 highlights both the potential limitations of future economic growth statistics as well as the reliance of many countries in SubSaharan Africa on exports of natural resources and, in some cases, trading
and other relationships with China.9 Further, despite the existence of positive economic growth trends in many Sub-Saharan African countries, a
number of challenges remain, some of which are related to persistent infrastructure deficits.10 It remains to be seen whether positive aggregate economic growth figures will be sustainable; will become a basis for
ameliorating pervasive, persistent, and profound inequality within Africa;
or will translate into improved economic and living conditions for the
majority of the continent’s population. Ultimately, the improvement of living conditions will depend to a significant degree on institutional
frameworks and infrastructures within countries in the Sub-Saharan African region.11 How the benefits of economic growth are to be shared
among the populace remains a key issue and challenge in many African
countries.12
In this era of seemingly robust economic growth prospects, China has
become Africa’s dominant trading partner.13 Bilateral trade and Chinese
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa have grown fourfold between
2001 and 2005.14 Although this Article focuses on Chinese involvement in
infrastructure projects in Africa, Chinese trade with— and investments in—
Africa include a broad range of sectors, geographic locations, and investment structures.15 The relationships between China and African countries
6. Laura N. Beny & Lisa D. Cook, Metals or Management? Explaining Africa’s
Recent Economic Growth Performance, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268, 270 (2009); Acha
Leke et al., What’s Driving Africa’s Growth, MCKINSEY Q. (June 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/whats_driving_africas_growth.
7. Leke, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Matina Stevis, Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Growth Rate to Stall in 2015, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sub-saharan-africas-economicgrowth-rate-to-stall-in-2015-1428926411.
10. BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA’S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIER FOR SUBSAHARAN AFRICA xi, xv (Vivien Foster et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter BUILDING BRIDGES]
(“Africa counts among its development challenges a major infrastructure deficit, with
large investment needs and an associated funding gap.”).
11. Id. at 31– 32.
12. Id. at 32– 33.
13. Frank Holmes, China Has Just Crossed a Landmark Threshold, VALUEWALK (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/02/china-gdp-vs-usa/.
14. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at xii.
15. See, e.g., Deborah Brautigam, & Sigrid-Marianella Stensrud Exman, Briefing:
Rumours and Realities of Chinese Agricultural Engagement in Mozambique, 111 AFR. AFF.
483, 483– 84 (2012); Deborah A. Brautigam, & Tang Xiaoyang, China’s Engagement in
African Agriculture: “Down to the Countryside”, 199 CHINA Q. 686, 686 (2009); Joshua
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unfold in a context shaped by a history of relationships between African
countries and external parties— particularly former European colonial
powers— which have far too often been exploitative and unequal.16 These
past interactions have been key elements in the construction of Africa in
time and space.17 China has positioned itself strategically and has sought
to distinguish its relationships with African countries from prior unequal
relationships, despite the reality of China’s, at times, less than happy
involvement in Africa.18 China’s interests in Africa are at once political,
economic, security-minded, and ideological.19
Regardless of one’s view of the future economic prospects of African
countries, a number of impediments to economic growth are readily apparent from even a cursory scrutiny of conditions within many African countries. Creating an environment for sustained and widespread economic
growth and improved human conditions remains a key policy challenge in
Sub-Saharan Africa.20 Projected Sub-Saharan African population growth
figures underscore the nature of this challenge: Africa is on the cusp of a
baby boom that may see populations in many African countries double
between now and 2050.21 In 2050, Africans will constitute an estimated
twenty-five percent of the world’s population, and thirty-seven African
Eisenman, China-Africa Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences, 21 J. CONTEMP. CHINA
793, 793 (2012).
16. See Eisenman, supra note 15, at 808.
17. Id. at 809.
18. YUN SUN, AFRICA IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 2 (2014), http://www.brookings
.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/africa-china-policy-sun/africa-in-chinaweb_cmg7.pdf (noting that “Africa is seen to be part of the ‘foundation’ on which
China’s broader strategic ambitions are built . . . Sino-African relations have been relatively smooth and free of major disturbances, thanks to a shared sense of historical victimization by Western colonial powers and a common identity/affinity as developing
countries. The nature of Sino-African ties is largely transactional and reciprocal.”); Julia
C. Strauss, The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s Relations
with Africa, 199 CHINA Q. 777, 777– 78 (2009) (noting that Chinese discourse concerning its involvement in Africa is framed as “positive, progressive and grounded in the
eternal and principled truths of non-interference, mutual benefit, unconditionality, and
special friendship and understanding towards Africa . . . [which] skates over some of the
realities in which China has been rather less happily involved. These include supporting
weak regimes and/or receiving leaders on the eve of their overthrow (Nkrumah in 1966);
flagrantly (and covertly) arming and aiding presumptively revolutionary rebellions
(Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South-West Africa/Namibia, Guinea/Cape Verde, Cameroon,
Congo, Algeria at different points from the early 1960s to the late 1970s) while publicly
preaching non-interference and mutual benefit; engaging in grubby competition with the
Soviet Union (notably Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s); and continuing to be
entangled with regimes whose human rights records have come under widespread criticism (particularly Sudan and Zimbabwe) in the present.”).
19. SUN, supra note 18, at 3.
20. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at xv.
21. U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2012 REVISION 1 (2015), http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_HIGH
LIGHTS.pdf; Stuart Burns, What Will 2050 Look Like?, METAL MINER (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://agmetalminer.com/2012/01/18/what-will-2050-look-like-economic-growth-insub-saharan-africa/; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-apreview-of-an-overcrowded-planet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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countries will have doubled their population.22 This population increase
could be the basis for a new era of African prosperity and economic transformation, or it could become a factor that precipitates yet more instability.
Policy approaches within many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa during the post-colonial period have led to practices and policies that have
been— to a significant degree— redistributive in focus with a concentration
on dividing a pre-existing economic pie rather than making the pie bigger.23 These approaches have contributed to pervasive corruption and economic stagnation as various groups within countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
have sought to gain a larger share of a fixed economic pie.24 In recent
years, a number of Sub-Saharan African countries have focused on more
pro-growth strategies that seek to grow the economic pie.25 These efforts,
however, could be significantly enhanced by greater attention to institutional structures that inhibit economic freedom and reduce economic
opportunities in Africa, particularly for those excluded from incumbent
elite networks.26 Of particular relevance are ways in which varied legal
frameworks have played a continuing role in institutional structures and
human outcomes in Africa.27
In addition, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have significant linguistic, religious, ethnic, and other sources of diversity.28 In much of the
post-colonial era, this diversity has been a source of division and in some
instances significant destruction.29 Limited economic opportunities for
many within African countries have further exacerbated such conflicts.30
Existing discourse about contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa has paid
significant attention to conditions in Africa and the economic, political,
and other terms of Africa’s engagement with external forces.31 Engagement with external forces, including between African countries and China,
22. MO IBRAHIM FOUND., AFRICA AHEAD: THE NEXT 50 YEARs 5 (2013), http://
static.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/2013/2013-facts-&-figuresan-african-conversation-africa-ahead-the-next-50-years.pdf.
23. See Benno J. Ndulo & Stephen A. O’Connell, Governance and Growth in SubSaharan Africa, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 53 (1999).
24. Id. at 55.
25. See SABINA DEWAN ET AL., PATHWAYS TO INCLUSIVE GROWTH: 5 STEPS TO CREATE
JUST JOBS IN AFRICA 3 (July 2014), http://justjobsnetwork.org/wp-content/pubs/reports/
5-Steps-to-Create-Just-Jobs-in-Africa.pdf.
26. Id. at 7.
27. See Ndulo & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 48.
28. INT’L ASSESSMENT OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH. FOR DEV., 5 AGRICULTURE AT
A CROSSROADS 40 (2009).
29. See William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic
Divisions, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1203, 1206 (1997) (considering the impact of economic diversity on growth in Africa, noting that “high levels of ethnic diversity are strongly linked to
high black market premiums, poor financial development, low provision of infrastructure, and low levels of education”).
30. Chris Cramer, The Economics and Political Economy of Conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa 15 (Ctr. for Dev. Pol’y & Res., Paper No. 1099), https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/
publications/papers/file24327.pdf.
31. See, e.g., HOWARD FRENCH, CHINA’S SECOND CONTINENT: HOW A MILLION MIGRANTS
ARE BUILDING A NEW EMPIRE IN AFRICA 4 (2014) (discussing Africa’s economic and political engagement with China).
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must be considered within the broader contexts of serious infrastructure
deficits. As Howard French notes, maps highlight the scarcity of infrastructure networks in Africa:
The story [the maps] told, via a sparse assortment of colored or dotted lines
representing Africa’s transportation infrastructure, was not just how to get
from one place to another, but how the continent was tied together— or not.
The scarcity of the lines, sketched against a backdrop of immense yellow
deserts, vast, green bands of forest that extended north from the coast in
West Africa . . . spoke of much more than the mere hugeness of the terrain . . . . The important roads were drawn like veins, in bold crimson with
black borders, and what was most striking about them was their paucity.
Most of them had been laid down under European rule. Studying them, one
quickly understood Europe’s goal was extracting as much value as possible
from Africa’s land and from its peoples, and especially of making imperialism self-financing. There was little variation on direct mine-to-port routing
for almost all the terrestrial infrastructure.32

Existing infrastructure deficits in Africa are rooted in the construction
of colonial territories and ensuing post-colonial states.33 Comparing
Africa with the rest of the world, particularly other countries in the developing world, underscores the extent to which Africa significantly trails the
world in virtually every possible measure of infrastructural development.34
Incomplete infrastructure construction has contributed to the high costs
and poor safety record of the transport sector in Africa.35 Underlying such
physical infrastructure deficits are significant gaps in legal and other institutions, as well as persistent problems throughout Sub-Saharan Africa with
the maintenance, management, and recreation of existing infrastructure
and institutions.36 This has led to deterioration and failed physical and
other infrastructures.37 In the case of railways, for example, infrastructure
deterioration has been a consequence of varied factors, including insufficient financial and technical resources, and inability of countries to produce infrastructure inputs such as railway equipment, which had to be
32. Id. at 161– 62.
33. KEN GWILLIAM, AFRICA’S TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE: MAINSTREAMING MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT 3 (2011), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/04/08/000333037_20110408010210/Rendered/
PDF/608030PUB0Afri10Box358332B01PUBLIC1.pdf.
34. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at 30 (“Sub-Saharan Africa currently lags
behind other developing regions on most standard indicators of infrastructure development . . . . This finding holds across a wide range of indicators including road density,
paved road density, electricity generation capacity per capita, and household access to
electricity, water, and sanitation.”).
35. GWILLIAM, supra note 33, at 6, 9 (noting that inland transport costs in Africa are
higher than in any other region of the world and that “all modes of transport, in particular road and air, have extremely poor safety records”).
36. Id. at 14– 15 (“Africa has inherited from its history a distorted and relatively
poor transport infrastructure, which it has neither managed nor maintained well.”).
37. Douglas A. Kolozsvari, Civil Society and the Protection of Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Colonial Railways: The Case of Madagascar’s Fianarantsoa-Côte Est Railway 118 (2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author), http://
deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/99911/dougkol_1.pdf?sequence=1
&isAllowed=y.
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imported.38 Structural adjustment programs during the 1980s imposed
strict controls on government spending, which also contributed to infrastructure deterioration.39
Processes of construction of infrastructures in Africa have thus been
fundamentally incomplete in important respects, which have contributed
to persistent poverty and instability in a number of African countries.40
The Millennium Development Goals— specific development goals with specific targets to be achieved by specific dates— are dependent in significant
part on “improvements in economic infrastructure services.”41 As a result
of past interactions, contemporary relationships between African countries
and China are filtered through lenses shaped by past experience.42 The
extent to which relationships with China will enable more complete infrastructure construction in Africa is not yet apparent. The lessons of history,
however, suggest that attention must be paid to processes of both deconstruction and construction that accompany external relationships, be they
with China or other external powers.
Infrastructure deficits may relate to a broad range of networked infrastructures.43 Significant commentary exists concerning deficits in physical infrastructure in Africa. These deficits comprise inadequacies in water
and sanitation infrastructures, transportation infrastructures (including
road, rail, port, and air transportation networks), electricity infrastructures, and telecommunications infrastructures (including inadequate fixedline telephones and broadband).44 In addition to tangible infrastructures,
a number of gaps are also evident in the management and governance
realm, including with respect to legal institutions.45 These governance
infrastructure gaps may reinforce physical deficits and hinder their
remediation. Further, many of the infrastructures created during and after
the colonial period were not as transformative as they might have been, in
38. Id. at 73; G.H. Pirie, The Decivilizing Rails: Railways and Underdevelopment in
Southern Africa, 73 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE 221, 223
(1982) (“. . . [R]ailway building in southern Africa set up relations of dependency on
overseas financial institutions and sources of equipment and maintenance supply.”).
39. Kolozsvari, supra note 37, at 6– 7.
40. Id. at 5.
41. CHRISTOPHER WILLOUGHBY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS 2 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/36567911.pdf; U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 7 (2005) (“Without basic infrastructure and human capital, countries are condemned to export a narrow range of low-margin primary commodities
based on natural (physical) endowments, rather than a diversified set of exports based
on technology, skills, and capital investments.”).
42. Luke Patey & Zhang Chun, China, Trade, Aid, and Africa, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e05c6154-a90b-11e3-9b71-00144feab7de
.html#axzz3qwTAcsuz.
43. GWILLIAM, supra note 33, at 3– 4 (noting that as a result of colonialism, transport
networks were extensive in linking ports and distant sources rather than intensive in
providing good network coverage within the territory).
44. See infra Part I.C.
45. See Courtney Hostetler, Note, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on World Bank Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 231,
232 (2014) (describing governmental corruption in various infrastructure projects).
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part because their legacy was largely limited to the physical object itself.46
In contrast, a legacy that included sufficient transfer of knowledge to facilitate better maintenance and recreation of new infrastructures at the local
level could have been a basis for significant transformation of infrastructure capacity within African countries.
This Article considers China’s investment activities in Africa in light of
existing and pervasive infrastructure deficits. Part I discusses infrastructure investment in the post-colonial era, and the development and continuing implications of infrastructure deficits. Part II contemplates approaches
that might assist in reducing existing deficits. Part III considers implications of Chinese infrastructure investments.
I.

Sub-Saharan Africa Infrastructure Deficits: Infrastructure
Investment in the Post-Colonial Era

A.

China’s Infrastructure Investments in Africa

Chinese activities in Africa are surprisingly controversial. From the
perspective of many countries in the West, Chinese activities in Africa have
been perceived as potentially exploitative and in support of repressive governments in a manner that had seemingly been reserved for those in the
West.47 Many of the objections of other powers to Chinese activities in
Africa are fairly astonishing given the history of prior unequal and
exploitative relationships between Africa and varied external powers.48
More problematic, perhaps, is a potential tendency of countries within
Africa to look to China as the latest external savior with insufficient African agency. Such countries fail to take sufficient steps internally to maximize returns from Chinese investments or undertake necessary internal
reforms to ensure sustainability of infrastructure projects.49 This is particularly true given concerns that emerged in 2015 concerning the potentially
deleterious impact of an economic slowdown in China on its trading
46. See Lamido Sanusi, Africa must get real about Chinese ties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0.html
(describing how China built infrastructure in Nigeria without transferring skills to local
communities, and comparing this model to colonialism).
47. Patey & Chun, supra note 42.
48. See Koloszvari, supra note 37, at 13 (describing French exploitation of railway
workers).
49. Sanusi, supra note 46. Sanusi explains:
So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was
also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure
raw materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new
form of imperialism . . . . This African love of China is founded on a vision of
the country as a saviour, a partner, a model. But working as governor of Nigeria’s central bank has given me pause for thought. We cannot blame the Chinese, or any other foreign power, for our country’s problems. We must blame
ourselves for our fuel subsidy scams, for oil theft in the Niger Delta, for our
neglect of agriculture and education, and for our limitless tolerance of incompetence. That said, it is a critical precondition for development in Nigeria and the
rest of Africa that we remove the rose-tinted glasses through which we view
China.
Id.
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partners in Africa.50
Although Chinese investments in African infrastructure have received
significant attention in recent years,51 Chinese economic engagement with
Africa has lasted longer than many assume: China constructed the
Tanzania-Zambia railway in the 1970s and had earlier engagements with
Africa prior to the twentieth century.52 Further, China is not alone in
undertaking significant investment activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, which
is also receiving increasing funding from India,53 the Gulf States, and
Japan.54 Chinese investments in Africa reflect an increasing flow of SouthSouth investments.55 Despite the significant attention paid to Chinese
investment activities in Africa, to date China’s investments in Africa
represent a small fraction of its global investment activities.56
In late January 2015, China entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the African Union to enhance and develop road, rail,
and air transportation links in Africa.57 The ambitious plans contemplated by the MOU (as described in media discussions of the MOU, which
50. Patrick McGroarty & Matina Stevis, In Africa, Those Who Bet on China Face Fallout, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-those-who-beton-china-face-fallout-1441760196; Rene Vollgraaff, These Are the African Nations Most
Exposed to China’s Slump, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/these-are-the-african-nations-most-exposed-to-china-sslump; Summer Zhen, South Africa Takes Measures to Tackle Fallout from China Slowdown, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/business/globaleconomy/article/1859944/south-africa-takes-measures-tackle-fallout-china-slowdown.
51. Ching Kwan Lee, The Spectre of Global China, 89 NEW LEFT REV. 29, 29 (2014)
(noting that “[China’s] presence in Africa has drawn a vast amount of attention, despite
the fact that [China] only accounts for a tiny fraction of foreign direct investment there—
4 per cent for 2000– 10, compared to 84 per cent for the Atlantic powers”); Wayne Ma et
al., China Offers Africa Billions in New Loans— Beijing, Seeking Stronger Economic Relations With the Resource-Rich Continent, Pledges to Address Trade Imbalances, WALL ST. J.
(July 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723963904444643045775361
40647257710.
52. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at 5; JAMIE MONSON, AFRICA’S FREEDOM RAILWAY:
HOW A CHINESE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CHANGED LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS IN TANZANIA 44
(2011); DAVID HAMILTON SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, CHINA AND AFRICA: A CENTURY OF
ENGAGEMENT 17 (2012).
53. Geeta Mohan, India-Africa Summit: Modi Power Draws 40 Leaders, THE SUNDAY
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/india-africa-summit-modi-power-draws-40-leaders.
54. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at 66; Steve Booysen, South-South Partnerships:
An African Recipe for Growth, 8 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 35, 35 (2007). See, e.g., Harry G.
Broadman, China and India Go to Africa— New Deals in the Developing World, 87 FOREIGN
AFF. 95 (2008); Dorothy McCormick, China & India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact
of Aid on Development, 35 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 73 (2008); Nicole Cassandra Naidoo,
Japan: The Biggest Asian Investor in Nigeria, CNBCAFRICA (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www
.cnbcafrica.com/news/special-report/2015/03/23/japan-investment-deals-nigeria-asia/.
55. Booysen, supra note 54, at 35.
56. SUN, supra note 18, at 2 (“China’s investment in and trade with Africa represents
3 percent and 5 percent of its global investment and trade, respectively. Politically, the
continent is of small importance to China’s foreign policy agenda, with Africa playing a
largely supportive role in China’s overall international strategy.”).
57. AU, China Agree Big Infrastructure Deal, NEWS24 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www
.news24.com/Africa/News/African-Union-China-agree-big-infrastructure-deal-201501
27.

R
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as of mid-2015 had not yet been made public) will unfold in a context of
significant Chinese investment and activity across a broad range of African
infrastructure projects.58 Many see China’s investment in African infrastructure as a key element in future African economic growth and productivity.59 Infrastructure projects are booming in Africa today,60 and China
is the largest bilateral investor in African infrastructure, with loans of $13.4
billion in 2013.61 Infrastructure investments by China in Africa reflect a
broader engagement by China with infrastructure investment globally;62
China has also been a motivating force in the development of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was created in 2014 to
address infrastructure investment gaps in Asia.63
Although the line between commercial and concessional financing
arrangements may at times be difficult to determine, China has also been
engaged in providing significant developmental assistance to Africa. Analysts disagree as to “the nature of China’s official development aid, the
countries that are its main recipients, the reasons for providing aid, the
quantity of official aid, and its impact.”64 Further, as sociologist Ching
Kwan Lee notes, use of the term “Chinese investment” “masks a hierarchy
of capitals of varying status, resourcefulness and connection to the Beijing
government.”65 Chinese investment may come from diverse sources that
have varied investment goals and objectives;66 investors may include cen58. See China to Cooperate with Africa on Building Infrastructure Networks, SHANGHAI
DAILY (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=
302861.
59. Chinese Investment Key to Improving Infrastructure in Africa, WORLD POL. REV.
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/15015/chinese-investment-key-to-improving-infrastructure-in-africa.
60. Bradley Seth McNew, It’s Time to Invest in Africa— Here Are Some Ways to Get
Started, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.fool.com/investing/international/2015/01/26/its-time-to-invest-in-africa-here-are-some-ways-to.aspx (“Across the
continent, including Sub-Saharan Africa, business and infrastructure projects are booming, prompting comparisons with China 20 to 30 years ago.”).
61. LE CONSORTIUM POUR LES INFRASTRUCTURES EN AFRIQUE, TENDANCES DU FINANCEMENT DES INFRASTRUCTURES EN AFRIQUE— 2013: RAPPORT ANNUEL DE L’ICA 40 (2014),
http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Annual_Reports/ICA-2013-INFRA-FINTRENDS-AFRICA-2013-FINAL-WEB-FRENCH.pdf (“La Chine reste le pays qui investit le
plus dans les infrastructures africaines. En 2013, les prêts ont atteint 13,4 Mrd $, ce qui
est comparable à 2012. Ils ont tous été dirigés vers l’Afrique sub-saharienne.”).
62. Shannon Tiezzi, China’s $1 Trillion Investment Plan: Stimulus or Not?, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 8, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-1-trillion-investment-planstimulus-or-not/.
63. Why China is creating a new “World Bank” for Asia, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 14,
2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economistexplains-6; Bree Feng, Deal Set on China-Led Infrastructure Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/asia/china-signs-agreement-with20-other-nations-to-establish-international-development-bank.html.
64. Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and
How Much?, in RISING CHINA: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 203, 203 (Jane
Golley & Ligang Song eds., 2011), http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload/Brautigam-Chinese-Aid-in-Africa.pdf.
65. Lee, supra note 51, at 34.
66. See Thomson Ayodele & Olusegun Sotola, China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment (Initiative for Pub. Pol’y Analysis, Working Paper, 2014).
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tral state-owned enterprises and policy banks, provincial state-owned
enterprises, private companies, and entrepreneurial or family firms.67 Chinese state capital comprises approximately half of the total Chinese investment in Africa.68
The 2015 African Union MOU reflects patterns of China’s engagement with infrastructure projects in Africa.69 Although trade between
China and Africa is not new,70 in recent years, China has financed largescale infrastructure projects throughout Africa.71 Chinese financing is provided primarily through the Chinese Export-Import Bank, at times on
terms that are “marginally concessional, though significantly less so than
those associated with [traditional overseas development aid].”72 Between
January 2010 and May 2012, China approved concessional loans worth a
total of $11.3 billion for ninety-two African projects.73 In 2007, China
established the China-Africa Development Fund to encourage and support
investment by Chinese enterprises in Africa.74 The China-Africa Development Fund focuses on five different areas: agriculture, industrial parks,
infrastructure, manufacturing, and mining and resources.75 By 2013, the
China-Africa Development Fund was managing some sixty projects in over
thirty countries in Africa, with total investments in South Africa alone
exceeding $400 million by the end of 2012.76
China also undertakes hybrid sovereign-commercial infrastructure
investment transactions.77 As of 2009, Chinese infrastructure investment
was highly concentrated, with four countries (Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia,
and Sudan) receiving seventy percent of investments.78 The two largest
sectors benefitting from Chinese infrastructure investment were power and
67. Lee, supra note 51, at 34– 35.
68. Id. at 35.
69. AU, China Agree Big Infrastructure Deal, supra note 57.
70. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at 5– 6 (describing Chinese aid provided to
Africa since the 1960s, as well as Chinese trade with Africa along the Silk Road, including a visit to East Africa by a Chinese admiral in the fifteenth century); George Klay
Kieh, Jr. & Edward Lama Wonkeryor, China’s Development Aid to Africa, 7 INT’L STUD. J.
131, 131 (2010).
71. JEFFREY GUTMAN, AMADOU SY & SOUMYA CHATTOPADHYAY, FINANCING AFRICAN
INFRASTRUCTURE: CAN THE WORLD DELIVER? 17 (Mar. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/
~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/03/financing-african-infrastructure-gutman-sychattopadhyay/AGIFinancingAfricanInfrastructure_FinalWebv2.pdf.
72. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at xii.
73. INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA-AFRICA ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION 10 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION], http://news.xinhuanet
.com/english/china/2013-08/29/c_132673093.htm.
74. Yuan Li, Guest Post: China Africa Development Fund in South Africa, CHINA IN
AFR.: THE REAL STORY (May 22, 2013), http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2013/05/
guest-post-china-africa-development.html.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Suzanne Siu, The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Materials for Infrastructure Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 599,
602– 03 (2010).
78. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at xiv.
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transport (primarily railroads).79 In 2012, Chinese enterprises completed
$40.8 billion in construction contracts in Africa, a forty-five percent
increase from 2009.80 These contracts accounted for thirty-five percent of
China’s completed overseas contract work.81 Chinese companies are also
playing a significant role in the transport sector in Nigeria and recently
built the first modern tramway in Sub-Saharan Africa, which opened in
Ethiopia in September 2015.82 China has also undertaken activities in the
power sector, recently signing a nuclear power partnership transaction in
Kenya.83
China imports significant amounts of natural resources from Africa.84
In 2009, China depended on Africa for some thirty percent of Chinese oil
imports, eighty percent of cobalt imports, and forty percent of manganese
imports.85 A significant number of Chinese Export-Import Bank infrastructure financing deals make use of “resources for infrastructure” deal
structures in which “repayment of the loan for infrastructure development
is made in terms of natural resources— for example, oil.”86 As is the case in
the recent MOU with the African Union, little public information is available concerning China’s infrastructure deals with African countries, including the financial terms of Chinese Export-Import Bank transactions.87
B.

Incomplete Construction

Infrastructures are important determinants of social and economic
development.88 Infrastructures are also “the key technological and physical assets of modern cities” connecting urban societies through complex
79. Id. at xiii.
80. CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, supra note 73, at 7.
81. Id. at 8.
82. DELOITTE ON AFRICA, AFRICAN CONSTRUCTION TRENDS REPORT 2014 15 (2015),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/manufacturing/za_af
rica_construction_trends_2015_10032015.pdf (noting that in Nigeria, “Chinese companies dominate the development of the transport network, particularly in the rail and
airport sub-sectors”); China in Driving Seat as Ethiopian Capital Gets New Tramway, THE
ECON. TIMES, (Sept.20, 2015), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/4903
6659.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
83. Press Release, Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board, Kenya Signs Nuclear Power Partnership Deal with China, http://www.nuclear.co.ke/press-release/69-kenya-signsnuclear-power-partnership-deal-with-china.html.
84. Lee, supra note 51, at 36 (noting that “the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a
key government think-tank, has identified resource security as the top priority for
China– Africa economic strategy over the next ten years”).
85. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at xvi.
86. Id. at xvii. See, e.g., MARCUS POWER ET AL., CHINA’S RESOURCE DIPLOMACY IN
AFRICA: POWERING DEVELOPMENT? (2012); Wenran Jiang, Fuelling the Dragon: China’s Rise
and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa, 199 CHINA Q. 585 (2009); Indira Campos & Alex Vines, Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership 1– 16 (Ctr. for Strategic &
Int’l Studies, Working Paper, 2008).
87. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 10, at 58.
88. BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES xi
(2014); César Calderón, Infrastructure and Growth in Africa 2 (The World Bank, Pol’y
Res. Working Paper No. 4914, 2009).
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interdependencies.89 Africa in particular boasts the highest urban growth
rates in the world,90 which has important implications for infrastructure
development in Africa.91 From a broader perspective, infrastructures provide connectivity between urban spaces and “wider regional, national, and
transnational networks.”92 As such, infrastructure encompasses both technical and cultural systems that “create institutionalized structures whereby
goods of all sort circulate, connecting and binding people into
collectivities.”93
Infrastructure has played an important role in post-colonial Africa,
where successive governments in varied countries have sought to build
modern, interconnected nations.94 Infrastructures not only reflect a technical process, but as anthropologist Brian Larkin suggests, “the provision
of infrastructures” are works of state representation.95 Infrastructure conceptualization and construction stand as pillars of the literal and figurative
creation of modern African states during both the colonial and post-colonial eras.96
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have significant infrastructure deficits as compared to other countries in the developing world.97 The current
poor condition of infrastructures throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is at least
in part a consequence of processes that began during colonialism.98 The
urbanization in which infrastructures play such a critical role has also
itself been significantly influenced by events during the colonial and precolonial eras that shaped patterns of institutional and societal construction
within Africa.99 Accordingly, infrastructure deficits are symptomatic of
broader problems in processes of societal construction.100 As a result, simply engaging outside parties to build infrastructure will not by itself fundamentally ameliorate conditions that have led to infrastructure deficits.101
Rather, new infrastructure projects must first take account of processes of
incomplete construction that have contributed to existing conditions and
89. STEPHEN GRAHAM & SIMON MARVIN, SPLINTERING URBANISM, NETWORKED INFRATECHNOLOGICAL MOBILITIES AND THE URBAN CONDITION 9– 10 (2001).
90. Mthuli Ncube, Urbanization in Africa, AFR. DEV. BANK (Dec. 13, 2012), http://
www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/urbanization-in-africa-10143/.
91. Although African populations presently remain primarily rural, estimates suggest that urban populations will constitute a majority of the population in Africa by
2020. AFRICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A TIME FOR TRANSFORMATION 127 (Vivien Foster &
Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia eds., 2010).
92. BRIAN LARKIN, SIGNAL AND NOISE: MEDIA, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND URBAN CULTURE IN
NIGERIA 5 (2008).
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 2.
97. Id. at 1.
98. Id.
99. TRISTRAM HUNT, CITIES OF EMPIRE: THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE CREATION OF THE
URBAN WORLD 8– 9 (2014).
100. GRAHAM & MARVIN, supra note 89, at 10.
101. James Blignaut, Fixing Africa’s Problems, 2 VRYE AFRIKAAN 1, 3– 4 (2005).
STRUCTURES,
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then attempt to deconstruct such processes in order to reconstruct infrastructures in a more effective manner. Colonialism and imperialism
involved processes of deconstruction and reconstruction.102 For example,
the Atlantic and Arab slave trade during the pre-colonial era played a significant role in processes of deconstruction in Africa.103 As a result, current
conditions in African countries today may reflect the negative consequences of centuries of historical experience, including decades of colonialism and centuries of slave trade104: “History lies heavy on Africa: the
long decades of colonialism, several hundred years of the Atlantic and Arab
world slave trade, and . . . countless centuries of indigenous slavery before
that.”105 Colonialism and the slave trade had a negative impact on African
institutional development, networked connectivity, and relationships
within African countries: “The enslavement of individuals had a devastating impact on the institutional development of the communities. Entire
communities degenerated into predatory societies.”106 The legal implications of this institutional deterioration are significant, particularly as legal
systems in Africa were used to facilitate slavery: “An additional consequence of the slave trade was the perversion of the legal system into a tool
for the enslavement of others. A non-trivial proportion (4– 11 %) of slaves
entered slavery through the judicial process.”107 Processes of deconstruction and construction prior to, during, and following colonialism continue
to have relevance to societal conditions within African nations.
C.

Physical Infrastructure Deficits in Africa

Infrastructure in the colonial state was typically oriented towards the
needs of colonial powers that controlled the colonial territory.108 This
meant that roads and other infrastructures were constructed within a colonial external extractive paradigm that focused on extracting resources for
the benefit of the home country, but did not focus sufficiently on internal
102. LARKIN, supra note 92, at 25; DAVID SCOTT, REFASHIONING FUTURES: CRITICISM
POSTCOLONIALITY 26 (1999) (discussing the relationship of colonialism with political forms of modernity, noting the emergence during colonialism of a form of power
“not merely coincident with colonialism . . . concerned above all with disabling old
forms of life by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with constructing in
their place new conditions so as to enable— indeed, so as to oblige— new forms of life to
come into being”).
103. Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, 123 Q. J. ECON. 139,
139– 40 (2008).
104. Id.
105. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 300 (1998).
106. Id. at 139.
107. Id.; Walter Hawthorne, The Production of Slaves Where There Was No State: The
Guinea-Bissau Region, 1450– 1815, 20 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 97, 119 (1999) (noting that
decentralized and stateless coastal groups produced slaves in a number of ways, including by “refashioning the judicial institutions that structured intra-group relations”).
108. GWILLIAM, supra note 33, at 3– 4.
AFTER
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infrastructure development and networked connectivity.109
The external extracting orientation of colonial infrastructure projects
extended to all aspects of colonial construction processes.110 As historian
Rudolf Mrázek notes with respect to a railroad construction project in
Indonesia:
As late as the mid-1920s, even the rails for the Indies railways were imported
from Europe . . . [a]s late as the early 1940s, to the end of the Dutch colonial
era, virtually all technical equipment came from the West . . . . Not a single
clerk, station master, or machinist was a non-European.111

Similar processes of construction were also evident in Africa, where railways, for example, were often built using forced and free labor.112 Railways
in Africa were constructed by European powers for various purposes,
including consolidating political and military control, access to natural
resources, and other factors relevant to their economic advantage.113
From the perspective of the local environment and local needs, colonial construction projects resulted in infrastructure that was not sustainable and that was also not capable of being recreated in the local
environment;114 such projects often used external raw materials, designed
systems largely with external input, and sourced network components
externally, among other externally oriented activities.115 In contrast, infrastructure projects that focus on a broader conceptualization of infrastructure that encompasses processes of knowledge and needs of the local
environment, may attempt to create local knowledge systems that enable
appropriate maintenance, processes, and logistics for delivery of raw
materials and management of large-scale projects, and spillovers, for example, from sourcing of local resources and raw materials.116 Attention to
local needs and impact would enable a more complete construction process
that could serve as an example for similar and dissimilar future infrastructure projects that could be transformative.
As a result of incomplete and externally oriented processes of colonial
construction, at independence, existing infrastructure networks in Africa
were not sufficiently targeted to meet the demands of developing economies and societies.117 During the post-colonial era, lack of capacity and
109. Kolozsvari, supra note 37, at 34; Joshua Dwayne Settles, The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic Development, 5 U. TENN. HONORS THESIS PROJECTS 7, 10, 11
(1996).
110. See Kolozsvari, supra note 37, at 5 (“Most railways built in [Sub-Saharan Africa]
had some type of extractive purpose in mind.”).
111. RUDOLF MRÁZEK, ENGINEERS OF HAPPY LAND: TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONALISM IN A
COLONY 10 (2002).
112. Kolozsvari, supra note 37, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 72– 74.
115. See generally Settles, supra note 109.
116. See e.g., AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP, AT THE CENTER OF AFRICA’S TRANSFORMATION: STRATEGY FOR 2013– 2022 15 (2013), http://www.africaneconomicoutlook
.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/PDF_Chapters/AfDB__2013___At_the_Center_of_Af
ricas_Transformation_-_Strategy_for_2013-2022.pdf.
117. Kolozsvari, supra note 37, at 34.
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persistent underinvestment by post-colonial states in Africa led to deterioration of infrastructures constructed during the colonial era and insufficient construction of new infrastructures.118 As a result, infrastructure
deficits in some instances intensified during the post-colonial era.119
The infrastructure deficits readily apparent in maps of the African
continent reflect this fundamentally incomplete nature of infrastructure
construction, as well as the construction of the post-colonial African state
itself.120 Infrastructure deficits are most evident in the lack of physical
infrastructures of varied types in Africa.121 In addition, the lack of
networked infrastructure evident in maps of Africa has contributed to the
economic isolation of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.122 Infrastructure
networks, or the lack thereof, are also an important element in incomplete
regional integration in the continent.123 Deficits are apparent in a broad
range of infrastructures in Africa.
1.

Water Resources and Sewage

Water infrastructure in Africa is not well developed, which has significant implications for human health and well-being. In 2008, an estimated
fifty-eight percent of Africans had access to safe drinking water.124 Hydropower and irrigation are also not well developed: five percent of Africa’s
cultivated land is irrigated, while less than ten percent of Africa’s hydropower potential has been tapped.125 Institutional frameworks for sanitation are fragmented throughout the continent, and a significant number of
countries in Africa spend no more than $1 per capita per year on sanitation.126 In the developing world generally, an estimated ninety percent of
sewage flows into waterways untreated,127 which has significant implications for human health and the spread of diseases such as cholera.128 In
2008, approximately fifty percent of the rural and urban population in
118. Id. at 118, 127– 29.
119. Id.
120. See ANDERBHAN WELDE GIORGIS, NATION BUILDING, STATE CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ERITREA 2 (2010).
121. John Mukum Mbaku, Building Opportunities: Addressing Africa’s Lack of Infrastructure, in FORESIGHT AFRICA: TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT, 2013 22, 22 (Afr.
Growth Initiative at Brookings ed., 2013).
122. BENNO NDULU ET AL., CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN GROWTH: OPPORTUNITIES, CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 89 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRI
CAEXT/Resources/AFR_Growth_Advance_Edition.pdf.
123. ANTON EBERHARD ET AL., AFRICA’S POWER INFRASTRUCTURE: INVESTMENT, INTEGRATION, EFFICIENCY 83 (2007).
124. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 271.
125. Id.
126. ELVIRA MORELLA ET AL., CLIMBING THE LADDER: THE STATE OF SANITATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA 6, 8 (2008), http://infrastructureafrica.org/system/files/BP13_Sanit_
sect_maintxtnew.pdf.
127. Water For All, MIT, http://12.000.scripts.mit.edu/mission2017/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2016) (noting that untreated wastewater “brimming with bacteria, viruses, and
parasites,” leads to an estimated 5 million deaths per year from waterborne diseases).
128. Id. (noting that the use of toilets is essential for containing the spread of
cholera).
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Africa continued to rely on traditional latrines, while forty-one percent and
less than ten percent in rural and urban areas, respectively, were estimated
to practice open defecation.129
Water resource management in Africa faces a number of challenges,
including high levels of hydro-climatic variability. Although the amount of
water in Africa
is comparable to that in other regions of the world . . . rainfall across much
of the continent is variable and unpredictable, both between and within
years . . . . Interannual rainfall variability in Africa, especially in eastern and
southern Africa, is high. These regions experience year-to-year variations
exceeding 30% around the mean, a rate much greater than the temperate
climates in Europe and North America . . . . High seasonal variability compounds these effects, causing droughts and floods. Runoff in Africa is
extraordinarily low, only half that in Asia, Australia, Europe, and North
America, despite having the same average precipitation. Low runoff coupled
with high rainfall variability explains the unpredictable, and relatively low,
seasonal and annual flows in many African rivers.130

These climatic factors make management of water resources and construction of water infrastructures more difficult;131 climate change will require
greater resiliency in management of water resources in Africa.132 Existing
variability is likely to increase in the future as a result of climate change,
which will also lead to significant temperature increases in Africa.133
Desertification in the Sahel region of Africa is yet another challenge to the
management of water resources that will be negatively affected by climate
change.134
Management of water resources is also complicated by the political
and geographic legacy that has resulted in multiple countries sharing the
same river basins. International river basins cover more than sixty percent
of the continent, and virtually all the region’s rivers cross several borders:
the Nile crosses ten, the Niger crosses nine, the Senegal crosses four, and
the Zambezi crosses eight.135 Such shared water resources require crossborder investment and management of water infrastructure, and may be
129. MORELLA, supra note 126, at 8.
130. Id.
131. WORLD BANK SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP’T, MAKING DEVELOPMENT CLIMATE RESILIENT: A
WORLD BANK STRATEGY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA xvii, xxv (Oct. 30, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/ClimateChange-StrategyReport2010Full_vNoImages.pdf.
132. Id. at xxv, 24 (“Africa has a very low level of economically developed infrastructure. There are few water control systems and little water storage capacity, despite relatively abundant resources. The transport, energy, information, and communication
systems are also poorly developed, which may hinder adaptation efforts. Further,
Africa’s rapidly urbanizing population is vulnerable due to poorly defined property
rights, weak land-use planning, and informal settlements, frequently on land subject to
erosion or flooding.”).
133. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 271.
134. Symposium, Land Degradation and Poverty, Int’l Fund for Agric. Dev. DirectorateGeneral for Dev. Coop. of the Min. of Foreign Aff., Italy, http://www.fao.org/docrep/
x5317e/x5317e01.htm.
135. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 272.
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the basis of conflicts among countries that share water resources.136
Water management institutions in many African countries “are weak
and fragmented,”137 which has an impact on management of rivers and
other water resources, as well as sectors such as agriculture, for which
access to water is critical:
Lack of water infrastructure and inadequate water management mostly
affect the poor. Africa’s poverty is closely linked to its dependence on rainfed subsistence farming . . . . Because subsistence agriculture is the dominant livelihood, rain-fall, droughts, and floods, combined with the weak marketing network and difficult physical access to many area [have a significant
impact on food security].138

Ineffective management of water resources has had a deleterious impact on
water catchments in Africa, leading to “excessive soil erosion, increased
costs of water treatment, rapid siltation of reservoirs, and disruption of
water supplies, and decline in economic life.”139 Monitoring of current
hydrological systems is insufficient and hydrographic networks are “outdated or in need of rehabilitation in many countries.”140 Further, “Africa
also lags behind the rest of the world in the number of meteorological stations where data can be systematically collected for dissemination to
users.”141
2.

Electricity

In the electrical sector, a power crisis is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa,
where electrical power is unreliable and where power generation capacity
is the lowest of any region in the world: “[h]ousehold connections to the
power grid are scarcer in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other developing
region.”142 Access and consumption of electricity have an impact on economic outcomes, including GDP levels.143 The energy gap between Africa
and the rest of the world is actually widening. A 2015 Africa Progress
Panel Report notes that:
Fifteen years ago, per capita energy use in Sub-Saharan Africa was 30 per
cent of the level in South Asia, now it is just 24 per cent and still falling . . . .
It would take the average Tanzanian around eight years to consume as much
electricity as an American uses in one month.144
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 274.
139. Id. at 275.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. EBERHARD, supra note 123, at 1.
143. ANTONIO CASTELLANO ET AL., BRIGHTER AFRICA: THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ELECTRICITY SECTOR 8 (2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
mckinsey/dotcom/insights/energy%20resources%20materials/powering%20africa/
brighter_africa_the_growth_potential_of_the_sub-saharan_electricity_sector.ashx
(“Countries with electrification rates of less than 80 percent of the population consistently suffer from reduced GDP per capita.”).
144. AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, POWER PEOPLE PLANET: SEIZING AFRICA’S ENERGY AND
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Prices for power in Sub-Saharan Africa are double that of other regions in
the world,145 while the combined power generation of the entire continent
equals that of Spain (or Argentina if South Africa is excluded).146 The
widespread use of generators further increases the costs of electricity in
Sub-Saharan Africa.147 Access to electricity is similarly low relative to
other developing countries: “[l]ess than 30 percent of the population of
Sub-Saharan Africa has access to electricity, compared with about 65 percent in South Asia and more than 90 percent in East Asia.”148 Excluding
South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where per
capita consumption of electricity is declining.149 The lack of electrical
power generation and access to electricity is costly, and estimating using
“the value of lost load or unserved energy, power outages in the countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa constitute an average of 2.1% of GDP.”150 The
financing gap for electricity is estimated to be $55 billion, or 3.4 percent of
Africa’s GDP.151
3.

Transportation and Logistics

Africa has the lowest national road density in the developing world,
with 204 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers of land area.152 One
quarter of such roads are paved, as compared with a world average of 944
per 1,000 square kilometers, where more than half of such roads are
paved.153 Although road density in Africa per capita is slightly higher than
levels in South Asia, and road density is high relative to GDP, overall road
density in Africa is “less than 30 percent of the next-lowest region, South
Asia.”154
Paved road density in Africa significantly trails the world,155 with significant capacity constraints being present in Africa:
The majority of roads have one lane in each direction, and where roads are
wider, pedestrians and parked vehicles often take up one lane. Intersections
are close together and are ill designed for turning. Service lanes are absent,
pavement is deteriorating, and street lighting is minimal. Because traffic
management is limited, accidents are frequent, with pedestrians accounting
CLIMATE OPPORTUNITIES— AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2015 16 (2015), http://www.africa
progresspanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/APP_REPORT_2015_FINAL_low1.pdf.
145. EBERHARD., supra note 123, at 1.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 7, 12.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 7.
151. AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL, supra note 144, at 16.
152. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 212.
153. Id. at 212.
154. Id.
155. KEN GWILLIAM ET AL., AFRICA INFRASTRUCTURE COUNTRY DIAGNOSTIC: ROADS IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA tbl.1, 2 (2008), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/06/18/000334955_20100618084412/Rendered/PDF/
551050WP0p109210Box349439B01PUBLIC1.pdf.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN104.txt

120

unknown

Seq: 20

19-MAY-16

Cornell International Law Journal

17:04

Vol. 49

for two-thirds of fatalities.156

Limited road density is particularly evident in rural areas: “African rural
communities have by far the lowest accessibility to an all-season road in the
developing world . . . . [Such] physical isolation prevents large areas of the
continent from reaching their agricultural potential.”157 Further, “only
one-third of rural inhabitants live within 2 kilometers of an all-season
road.”158
Significant weaknesses exist in other areas of the African transport
sector, including with respect to ports and logistics systems.159 These
weaknesses are in part a consequence of ineffective regulation of transport
markets: “[r]egulation of these [transport] markets often remains obstructive rather than constructive,” which reduces efficiency and increases
costs.160 Similarly, transport logistics in Africa are made more difficult by
a lack of logistics competence, as measured by factors such as “the efficiency of customs and other border agencies, the ease and affordability of
arranging international shipments, the competence of the local logistics
sector, the ability to track and trace shipments, and their timeliness.”161
Trucking industry cartels and dispatching practices contribute to high road
freight tariffs in Sub-Saharan Africa.162
Significant transport capacity limitations are also present within
urban areas in Africa:
Africa’s rapidly growing cities face major mobility problems . . . . Urban road
density is low by developing-country standards . . . following the demise of
large buses in many cities, myriad informal minibus operators largely dominate urban transport services. Services are costly, and availability is inadequate . . . . Few countries capture sufficient financial resources to develop
and maintain the urban road network.163

Ineffective regulation, including overlapping “national, metropolitan, and
municipal jurisdictions present serious institutional challenges”164 and
156. Id.; PATRICIO V. MARQUEZ & JILL L. FARRINGTON, THE CHALLENGE OF NON-COMMUDISEASES AND ROAD TRAFFIC INJURIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW 13
(2013) (noting that road traffic injuries (RTIs) and non-communicable diseases are
major causes of death and disability in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Africa having the highest age-standardized mortality rates for injuries, including RTIs).
157. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 212.
158. Id. at 211.
159. Id. at 203 (“Except in South Africa, inland transport and facilities are poorly
aligned with port development.”). See also JOHN RIVERSON ET AL., RURAL ROADS IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE 1 (1991), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1991/07/440100/rural-roads-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-world-bank-experience (noting deficient rural transport capacity in Africa).
160. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 203– 05.
161. Id. (“Except for South Africa, Sub-Saharan African countries perform poorly not
only on infrastructure quality, but also on all the main aspects of logistics
competence.”).
162. Id. at 211– 12.
163. Id.; GWILLIAM, supra note 33, at 17 (noting that road passenger transport has
suffered from counterproductive fare regulation, particularly in urban areas, which has
led to most service being provided by the self-regulated informal sector).
164. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 211– 12.
NICABLE
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magnify existing infrastructure deficits.165
4.

Railways

Rail networks in Africa are “disconnected, and many are in poor condition.”166 Few countries have invested in maintaining railway lines and
most railway networks outside of South Africa still operate with original
facilities: “[m]any structures and some of the track work are now over 100
years old. Many sections of track have deteriorated almost beyond
repair.”167 Further, “[v]arious conflicts and wars have rendered several
rail sections unusable.”168 Although railway master plans have “existed for
over a century,”169 railway lines remain disconnected.170 Persistent underinvestment is a major factor in the poor condition of rail networks in
Africa: “Few railways are able to generate significant funds for investment . . . investment has usually come from bilateral and multilateral
donors. Almost all remaining passenger services fail to cover their costs,
and freight service tariffs are constrained by road competition.”171
The poor condition of African rail networks is in part a consequence
of bureaucratic constraints and reflects a significant colonial influence in
patterns of railway development in Africa:
Railway development has followed a similar pattern in almost all African
countries. Typically, isolated lines headed inland from a port to reach a
trading center or a mine, and over time, a few branch lines were built. Many
of the lines were state owned, but some were constructed as concessions or,
in the case of some mineral developments, as part of a mining company’s
operation. Although continental rail master plans have existed for over a
century, most of the African network remains disconnected, operating
within a single country or linking a port and its immediate regional hinterland . . . . Trade between African countries (other than to and from South
Africa) has always been minimal, largely because of the similarity in the
products exported, which suggests that interregional links would be lightly
used even if they existed.172

5.

Ports

Despite significant growth in general cargo and containerized cargo
transiting African ports,173 a number of impediments constrain the development of port infrastructures in Africa: “many African countries are
trapped in a vicious circle of high tariffs discouraging traffic and further
increasing costs.”174 Poor inland links, wasteful and costly port adminis165. See id.
166. Id. at 229.
167. Id. at 230.
168. Id. at 229.
169. Id. at 230.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 249 (noting that cargo passing through African public ports has trebled
since the mid-1990s).
174. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN104.txt

122

unknown

Seq: 22

19-MAY-16

Cornell International Law Journal

17:04

Vol. 49

tration, and limited integrated land distribution systems with many ports
being “poorly equipped and inefficiently operated”175 are some of the challenges that hinder the development of port infrastructures.
6.

Airports and Air Transit

In addition to being expensive, air transport in Africa suffers from the
poorest safety record in the world.176 In 2004, Africa experienced twentytwo percent of all accidents world-wide but only accounted for only 4.5
percent of sectors flown globally.177 In 2006 African carriers lost 4.31
aircraft per million departures, far higher than worldwide levels of 0.65
aircraft per million departures.178 In 2012, the African safety record worsened with 3.71 Western-built jet hull losses per million flights, up from
3.27 in 2011.179 In 2013, of the estimated two hundred airlines operating
in Africa, only thirty-eight met global safety standards.180 Flying in Africa
is estimated to be twelve times more deadly than flying in other regions of
the world.181
Moreover, landing charges are high and traffic volumes are relatively
low.182 Domestic and international routes in Africa “often remain protected, and many small, nonviable state-owned operations continue, particularly in southern Africa, that are protected at the expense of potential
users of air transport.”183 Substandard regulatory oversight, inadequate
safety management systems, and deficient safety management systems contribute to Africa’s poor air transport safety record.184 The poor safety
records of Sub-Saharan African carriers are also consequences of administrative weaknesses, including limited oversight of operators, “poor pilot
capabilities and weak safety administration rather than the age of aircraft.”185 Although runways and terminal capacity are generally adequate
in Africa, significant weaknesses exist in air traffic control and
surveillance186:
Air traffic control infrastructure in Africa is wanting, with the exception of
airports in South Africa and Kenya. Addis Ababa uses no civilian radar,
forcing extra distance and time separations between aircraft. In Malawi, as
equipment has aged and become too expensive to maintain, surveillance has
fallen into disrepair. Even when the equipment exists, radar procedures
175. Id.
176. Id. at 259– 60 (noting that “Sub-Saharan African carriers have the world’s worst
accident record”).
177. Id. at 263.
178. Id.
179. MO IBRAHIM FOUND., supra note 22, at 67.
180. Id.
181. Andrew Rosthorn, Training for Total Control in African Skies, NEW SECURITY
LEARNING, http://www.newsecuritylearning.com/index.php/feature/154-training-fortotal-control-in-african-skies (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
182. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 263.
183. Id. at 259– 60.
184. Id. at 268.
185. Id. at 260.
186. MO IBRAHIM FOUND., supra note 22, at 67.
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(and radar separations) are not always implemented. In Kenya, only the airport in Nairobi has full-time radar vectoring, while that in Mombasa
switches to radar only if weather so demands. In Tanzania, Dar es Salaam’s
airport has a good radar installation, with a secondary radar range in excess
of 200 miles, but has no radar vectoring because of a lack of radar-certified
controllers.187

Aircraft surveillance and communication to and from the ground is also
limited; in certain areas of Africa aircrafts can fly for an hour or more
without being able to make contact with the ground.188 This lack of surveillance has significant consequences for search and rescue operations.189
Aircrafts flying in Africa also receive limited information concerning
weather: “[w]eather installations are . . . sparse, often relying on physical
observation using manual techniques now commonly automated in the
West.”190 Furthermore, broadband infrastructure is not available in most
airports in Africa.191
7.

Telecommunications Infrastructure

Although the telecommunications sector in Africa is experiencing
explosive growth, the number of fixed phone lines in Africa is significantly
lower than elsewhere in the world, with an average of ninety-three main
telephone lines per 1,000 workers in 2001– 2005, as compared with 1,096
in Western Europe, and 796 in East Asia and the Pacific.192 The African
fixed phone line numbers for 2001– 05 represent more than nine times the
figure in 1991– 95.193 Growth in the African telecommunications sector
has led to a decline in fixed phone line infrastructure gaps, although the
gap remains quite large.194
Nevertheless, Africa has higher growth rates and greater digital mobile
penetration than other developed countries do.195 In fact, due to the nonexistence and unreliability of fixed phone lines, mobile subscribers in
Africa grew eighteen percent annually in the five years preceding 2013.196
Many in Africa have gone from having no telephone or minimal fixed
phone line service directly to digital mobile phones without experiencing
analog mobile technology that preceded digital mobile technology in many
187. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 267.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Calderón, supra note 88, at 7– 8.
193. Id. at 8.
194. Id.
195. See Jeffrey James, Leapfrogging in Mobile Telephony: A Measure for Comparing
Country Performance, 76 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 991, 992 (2009); Paul
Kagame, President of Rwanda, Kari Taylor Compton Lecture, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Sept. 18, 2008), http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/604 (discussing the leapfrogging nature of mobile telephone technology in Africa, which has facilitated the development of businesses).
196. See GSMA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MOBILE ECONOMY 2013 10 (2013), http://
gsmamobileeconomyafrica.com/Sub-Saharan%20Africa_ME_Report_English_2013.pdf.
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areas of the world.197 A 2007 report indicated that digital mobile phone
subscriptions in Africa accounted for ninety-five percent of all mobile subscribers, and made up eighty-three percent of all phones.198
Only one in ten households in Africa has internet access.199 Fixed
line broadband connections in Africa lag behind the rest of the world, as do
internet protocol television (IPTV) numbers.200 Compared to over 44 million in East Asia, 13 million in North America, and over 28 million in
Europe, Africa had 128,500 IPTV subscribers in the fourth quarter of
2014.201 Broadband penetration in Africa is low, and eight of the ten
countries with the lowest broadband penetration in the world are located
in Africa.202 Not surprisingly, digital broadband is more widespread in
Africa.203 Although broadband backbone infrastructure in Africa has
expanded in recent years,204 telecommunications backbone infrastructures
remain limited in Africa.205 Estimates from 2013 suggest that ninety percent of calls between African countries are routed through Europe, which
costs an estimated $400 million annually.206
II. Reconstructing Africa: Reducing Infrastructure Deficits
A.

Corruption, Institutions, and Infrastructure

The incomplete construction of state institutions and their legal
frameworks are perhaps less tangible manifestations of the same processes
that led to incomplete construction of physical infrastructures.207 Infrastructure networks and connectivity are about more than physical infrastructure. They also require other infrastructures, including infrastructure
197. See, e.g., Kagame, supra note 195.
198. The figures for Europe were ninety-two percent and sixty-eight percent respectively. Abi Jagun et al., Mobile Telephony and Developing Country Micro-Enterprise: A
Nigerian Case Study 2 (U. of Manchester, Inst. for Dev. Pol’y & Mgmt. Dev. Informatics,
Working Paper No. 29, 2007), http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/di/di_wp29.htm.
199. U.N. BROADBAND COMM’N, BROADBAND FOR ALL 40 (2014), http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2014.pdf.
200. Gareth van Zyl, Why a Broadband Fibre-Infrastructure Boom Awaits Africa,
ITWEBAFRICA (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.itwebafrica.com/network/333-africa/2327
23-why-a-broadband-fibre-infrastructure-boom-awaits-africa#sthash.zXdA6xda.dpuf.
201. Id.
202. Olusegun Abolaji Ogundeji, As Africa Internet Penetration Lags, Experts Suggest
Ways to Spur Broadband Growth, PC WORLD (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/2692172/as-africa-internet-penetration-lags-experts-suggest-ways-to-spur-broadband-growth.html.
203. U.N. BROADBAND COMM’N, supra note 199, at 87.
204. COMMONWEALTH TELECOM. ORG., THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT FOR BROADBAND IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE SATELLITE ADVANTAGE 6, 11, 12, http://www.cto.int/media/
research/projects/Socio-Economic_Impact_of_Broadband_The_Satellite_Advantage.pdf.
205. See Extending Rural ICT Access in Africa: Background Paper— Session Three,
Connect Africa Summit, Kigali, Rwanda, Oct. 26, 2007, https://www.unido.org/
fileadmin/media/documents/pdf/connect_africa_s3-backgrounder.pdf.
206. JABULANI DHLIWAYO, DEVELOPING A FIBRE OPTIC BACKBONE FOR AFRICA 1, 2 (May
2013), http://networks.jcbroadband.com/downloads/developing_fiber_backbone_for_af
rica.pdf.
207. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91, at 159.
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management services, to manage and maintain infrastructures, and legal
and regulatory frameworks to facilitate such connectivity.208 As a result,
infrastructure investments must be accompanied by institution-building
and reform that deconstructs existing impediments and constructs competencies in such a way as to foster continued renewal of infrastructure and
institutions. At a minimum, principles of good governance that include
mechanisms for transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness should be
a key aspect of infrastructures to enable processes that facilitate more complete construction.
Entrenched corruption exists in contexts of large-scale infrastructure
projects in Africa and elsewhere in the world.209 As a result, the extent and
scope of corruption in connection with such projects may play a critical
role in determining project effectiveness and success.210 Any discussion of
improving infrastructures and institutions in Africa must take account of
the endemic corruption that exists in many African countries.211
Although corruption is certainly not unique to Africa and has been present
in different contexts throughout the world,212 the levels and types of corruption in Africa are generally thought to be a significant impediment to
the amelioration of existing political, economic, and social conditions.213
Although public expressions of outrage against corruption and corrupt
officials are increasingly common in Africa,214 the roots and legacy of corruption cast a shadow over future economic, political, and social
endeavors.215
Corruption also plays an important role in the private accumulation
by public officials in many African countries and has developed regardless
208. Id. at 221.
209. Courtney Hostetler, Note, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231,
232 (2011).
210. Id. at 233.
211. J.P. Olivier de Sardan, A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?, 37 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 25, 25 (1999) (noting the “rampant corruption affecting the totality of African
countries”).
212. Simon Coldham, Legal Responses to State Corruption in Commonwealth Africa, 39
J. AFR. L. 115, 115 (1995) (noting that corruption was common during the colonial
period in Africa and served to bolster the colonial system); Colin Leys, What is the Problem About Corruption?, 3 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 215, 221 (1965) (discussing ways to analyze
alleged cases of corruption); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The
Ghanaian Experience, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 71, 72 (1973) (noting that although corruption
was blatant in nineteenth-century America, it did not apparently slow economic
development).
213. Werlin, supra note 212, at 73, 76 (noting that corruption may be a greater cause
for concern in emerging nations compared to the United States and other developed
countries, and noting intensified inter-ethnic conflict in Ghana).
214. See Ernest Harsch, Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in
Africa, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 31, 32 (1993).
215. See generally Dhaneshwar Ghura, Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of
Economic Policies and Corruption (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 98/135, Sept.
1998), http://ssrn.com/abstract=882694 (considering the impact of corruption on the
tax revenue base in Africa).
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of a state’s official ideology or overall economic approach.216 Corruption
is often associated with rent seeking and other non-productive economic
activities.217 Corruption is “inimical to democratic practice because it
abhors, by its very nature, the open light of public scrutiny and control.”218
Corruption also serves to entrench established incumbent elites, who use
government institutions as instruments of enrichment of members of politically dominant groups.219 Corruption can also significantly limit
entrepreneurial business and other activities that may enhance opportunities for people within Africa.220 Mo Ibrahim, Sudanese billionaire and
founder of Celtel International, noted that he was able to avoid paying
bribes in developing his mobile telecommunications company because
“bureaucrats and others opening up the way for his company really
believed they would not make money.”221
New governments in Africa frequently begin with anti-corruption
drives.222 Such drives are, however, frequently short-lived and “forgotten
once the initial zeal for reform had faded or the new authorities themselves
succumbed to temptation.”223 In other instances, anti-corruption drives
have been used to target political opponents.224 The endemic nature of
corruption in Africa suggests that in addition to legal sanctions, which may
not be effective,225 an approach that focuses on the nature of the relationships desired and that attempts to create incentives to foster such relationships may be fruitful.226 In addition, transparency in infrastructure
projects, particularly in relation to key transactional terms, including eco216. Harsch, supra note 214, at 37; John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption in
Africa: The Futility of Cleanups, 16 CATO J. 99, 99 (1996), http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/cj16n1-6.html.
217. Harsch, supra note 214, at 41; Mbaku, supra note 216, at 105 (“Throughout
Africa, from Algeria to Zaı̈re, bureaucrats and politicians promote perverse economic
policies, which while impoverishing most of society, provide concentrated and significant benefits to the national elites and interest groups.”).
218. Harsch, supra note 214, at 32.
219. See Mbaku, supra note 216, at 105 (“Nigeria is not the only country in Africa in
which the apparatus of government has become an instrument for the enrichment of
members of the politically dominant group. South Africa, long regarded by many scholars in the West as a bastion of for free enterprise in Africa, has for many years promoted
laws that allowed the white majority to use the redistributive powers of the state to
enrich itself while sentencing the black majority to perpetual poverty and deprivation.”)
(citations omitted).
220. See Harsch, supra note 214, at 41.
221. #1638 Mohammed Ibrahim, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/mohammedibrahim/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2015); Unleashing Entrepreneurship in Africa: Policy
Choices Matter, WORLD BANK (Apr. 30, 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/X43ZMCEGK0
WorldBank.
222. Harsch, supra note 214, at 32.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 33.
225. John Macrae, Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory
Approach, 10 WORLD DEV. 677, 686 (1982) (suggesting that legal sanctions may not
effectively reduce corruption which has its roots in the day-to-day operation of the society at all levels).
226. Id. (suggesting that calculated self-interest may be one way to reduce corruption
in instances where corruption is endemic).
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nomic and commercial ones, may be an important element in combating
corruption.227
B.

Deconstructing Impediments to Robust Infrastructures

Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate how institutional
frameworks that have developed to date may exacerbate infrastructure deficits.228 This suggests that successfully addressing the infrastructure deficits in Africa will require attention to existing institutional paths and
frameworks.229 This raises questions about not only institutions, but also
about broader issues of governance and the fundamental legal relationships that institutions and policies are intended to promote. Governance
in this context has been defined as the “traditions and institutions by
which authority in a country is exercised.”230 As such, governance is a
broader and more inclusive term than government and “refers to the general manner in which a people is governed [and] can apply to the formal
structures of government as well as to the myriad institutions and groups
which compose civil society in any nation.”231
The institutions that might be needed to ameliorate infrastructure deficits are often considered in discussions of infrastructure in Africa.232
What is often not considered sufficiently in such discussions are the legal
structures that might be needed to accomplish such goals and the ways in
which specific incentives can be built into the recommended institutional
frameworks.233 Even if legal structures are discussed, the legal relationships that are sought and the structures of incentives necessary to create
such relationships are often not sufficiently considered.234
Institutions that arose in the colonial era are still present and even
predominant in some African countries.235 These institutions are reflected
in legal and regulatory environments that have not fostered the develop227. See Harsch, supra 214, at 37.
228. Cf. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, History Lessons: Institutions,
Factors, Endowments and Paths of Development in the New World, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 217,
224– 28 (2000) (discussing how the path of institutional development affected relative
growth among New World economies).
229. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 404– 27 (2012) (discussing how countries can change their economic path by altering their institutions).
230. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III:
Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, 18 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 253,
254 (2004) (noting that governance “includes the process by which governments are
selected and replaced, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them”).
231. CARTER CTR., PERESTROIKA WITHOUT GLASNOST IN AFRICA 4– 5 (1989), http://www
.cartercenter.org/documents/1211.pdf.
232. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 229, at 404– 14.
233. See, e.g., id.
234. See, e.g., id.
235. See, e.g., Joanna Stevens, Colonial Relics I: The Requirement of a Permit to Hold a
Peaceful Assembly, 41 J. AFR. L. 118, 132– 33 (1997).
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ment of robust infrastructures.236 Without some process of deconstruction, at least some of these institutions may continue to impede the
development of robust infrastructures. In the power sector, for example,
significant challenges exist to attracting investment to hybrid power markets, arising from varied limiting factors, including the identity of those
holding responsibility for power sector planning, procurement management processes, and investment allocation among state owned utilities and
independent power producers.237
The use of un-deconstructed models of colonial-based legal relationships in Africa is also potentially made more difficult by the historical
experiences of the slave trade and colonialism, which helped give shape to
distinctive conditions in Africa that remain influential today.238 Much has
been written concerning post-colonial African economic, political, and
social conditions.239 Although decolonization brought independence to
former colonies, “it did not, as a rule, change the underlying social and
economic structures of their societies.”240 Consequently, although authoritarian in nature,241 the colonial state, as a legally constituted and administered state, became a basis for post-independence legal structures.242
Colonial rule, however, significantly impaired a fluid transition to postindependence democratic rule;243 colonial governments focused on having
minimal colonial administration and sought to make colonial territories
self-governing.244 As a result, education was typically handled by Christian missionaries and economic activities by commercial companies.245
The colonial powers saw little need for rapid development:
In much of Africa, therefore, the colonial imprint was barely noticeable . . . .
In northern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard set out to rule 10 million people with
a staff of nine European administrators and a regiment . . . consisting of
3,000 African troops under the command of European officers.246

British indirect colonial rule in northern Nigeria reflected a particular
emphasis on retaining “traditional” rulers in a way that served to
236. See, e.g., ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 229, at 245– 73 (discussing how
colonialism often resulted in “reversing development”).
237. EBERHARD, supra note 123, at 79– 80.
238. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 229, at 368.
239. See, e.g., id.
240. Yash Ghai, The Role of Law in the Transition of Societies: The African Experience,
35 J. AFR. L. 8, 8 (1991).
241. Id.; James S. Read, Studies in the Making of Colonial Laws: An Introduction, 23 J.
AFR. L. 1, 6 (1979) (noting that colonial subjects were scarcely consulted at all in the
process of colonial law-making).
242. Ghai, supra note 240, at 8 (noting that despite its authoritarianism, the colonial
state “was a legally constituted and administered state”).
243. Barry Munslow, Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?, 36 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 218, 224 (1983) (“Colonial rule was by no means a preparation for post-independence democratic government. It was extremely hierarchical, at best paternalist and
at worst authoritarian.”).
244. MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 5 (2005).
245. Id.
246. Id.
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strengthen and solidify the power of such rulers, while at the same time
creating a distinct governance structure that continues to be a basis for
division and conflict in Nigeria today.247
The legacy of former European colonial powers in Africa “was not
democracy as it is practiced today in countries like England, France, and
Belgium; it was authoritarian rule and plunder.”248 Current conditions in
many parts of Africa today are in part a consequence of circumstances and
laws that were created during and prior to the colonial era.249 In the political sphere, for example,
Africa inherited liberal democracy . . . from the accelerated and panicky
process of rapid decolonization. It was only in the last decade of colonialism, when independence became a certainty, that the imperialist powers
gradually began to institute democratic reforms in what had hitherto been
structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation.250

It is not surprising that such models disintegrated rapidly.251 What was
left following such disintegration was characterized by few successes that
were often “precarious, temporary, and crippled by . . . class and ethnic
limitations.”252 The failures were “egregious, massive, and tragic,” and any
remaining civil liberties “fragile, vulnerable, and under constant threat of
death.”253 This fragile and precarious state reflects the extent to which
institutional structures to support liberal democracy customized to fit the
African political and economic reality did not emerge to a significant
degree in Africa in the post-colonial era.254 This is often interpreted as a
matter of failed institutions and institutional frameworks, and the fault
often attributed to Africans, sometimes interpreted as failures in competence and capacity.255 The factors underlying failed African political and
economic models, however, are quite complex and rooted in the historical
experiences of African countries, both with respect to colonialism,256 as
well as the slave trade and pre-colonial institutions.257 Needless to say,
247. LARKIN, supra note 92, at 21– 25.
248. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 105, at 300.
249. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 235, at 133 (discussing contemporary legal treatment of questionable laws of colonial or other origin).
250. Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 455, 457 (1990)
(discussing the emergence of modern authoritarianism in Africa).
251. Id. at 458.
252. Id. at 459.
253. Id.
254. See generally id. at 249.
255. Munslow, supra note 243, at 219 (“When failures took place like a collapsing
house of cards, reasons were sought in the Africans’ unpreparedness for democracy,
with a reversion to the traditional systems.”).
256. See James Robinson, States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey Herbst: A Review Essay,
40 J. ECON. LIT. 510, 512 (2002) (“Africa is different because the structural conditions
that led to the path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent in
Africa.”).
257. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 229, at 102– 04; Daron Acemoglu et al., The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1370 (2001)
[hereinafter Acemoglu, Colonial Origins] (using settler mortality rates to demonstrate
that colonies with higher European mortality rates are today substantially poorer than
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fragile and unstable states may not be best positioned to engage in infrastructure construction or renewal.258 Furthermore, colonialism itself may
have created an environment of governance within colonies in Africa in
which nepotism and incompetence were rewarded, while “merit and
achievement were irrelevant.”259
Recent empirical studies suggest that state legitimacy in African countries today may be partially dependent on the congruence between pre- and
post-colonial political structures.260 In many regions of Africa, this congruence was significantly influenced by the commercial and other activities undertaken by European companies and governments prior to the
colonial era, including slave trading, which led to significant political fragmentation in large swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa prior to the formal creation of African colonies at the Conference of Berlin in 1884– 85.261 The
Conference of Berlin has been described as “the biggest Monopoly game in
history.”262 The divisions made at the Conference of Berlin were based on
inaccurate, little, or no information.263
The consequences of such divisions and the colonial policies that followed were, however, profoundly important for present conditions in Subcolonies that were healthier for Europeans, suggesting that in colonies where Europeans
settled, colonial powers established different institutional frameworks as contrasted at
the other extreme with “extractive” institutional models exemplified in the Belgian
Congo); Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the
Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1231, 1279 (2002)
(noting that European colonization lead to institutional reversal and a reversal in relative
incomes among countries that were relatively rich in 1500 that are now relatively poor).
258. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 229, at 88.
259. LARKIN, supra note 92, at 22– 23. See KWASI KWARTENG, GHOSTS OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN’S LEGACIES IN THE MODERN WORLD 8 (2012).
260. Pierre Englebert, Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic
Development in Tropical Africa, 53 POL. RES. Q. 7, 14 (2000) (noting that congruence
between pre-colonial and post-colonial political structures is an important determinant
of state legitimacy in Africa today).
261. RUTH WATSON, ‘CIVIL DISORDER IS THE DISEASE OF IBADAN’: CHIEFTAINCY AND CIVIC
CULTURE IN A YORUBA CITY 4 (2003) (noting the disruption and political turmoil in contemporary southwestern Nigeria from the 1820s onward, connected to the combination
of the collapse of the Oyo Empire, the expansion of the Sokoto Caliphate, and the prohibition and disruption of the Atlantic slave trade); A.G. Hopkins, Economic Imperialism in
West Africa: Lagos, 1880-92, 21 ECON. HIST. REV. 580, 586– 875 (1968) (noting that the
slave trade led to civil disorder and inter-state warfare, and encouraged the rise of a
warrior class that exerted significant influence over the policies of Yoruba states, including Ibadan, which was formed as a war camp); Nathan Nunn & Leonard Wantchekon,
The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 3221 (2011);
Nunn, supra note 103, at 139.
262. NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: HOW BRITAIN MADE THE MODERN WORLD 233 (2003)
(noting that “[t]he biggest game of Monopoly in history was about to begin. Africa was
the board”).
263. MEREDITH, supra note 244, at 1. Meredith explains:
The maps used to carve up the African continent were mostly inaccurate; large
areas were described as terra incognita. When marking out the boundaries of
their new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing
straight lines on the map, taking little or no account of the myriad traditional
monarchies, chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground.
New boundaries cut through some 190 culture groups.
Id.
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Saharan Africa. In fact, “[S]ub-Saharan Africa has the largest concentration
of arbitrary postcolonial states, with little or no embeddedness into
precolonial institutions and preexisting norms of political authority, [and]
its economic performance tends to be weaker even after controlling for
other variables known to differ between Africa and other regions.”264 The
colonial power under which a country was formed may also have an influence on post-colonial economic performance.265
Further, states with greater legitimacy among developing countries
have significantly better economic performance and have grown at five
times the rate of states with less legitimacy.266 Legitimacy plays an important role in the development of effective institutional frameworks that were
so important in the economic development of Europe, for example, as well
as the construction of robust infrastructures.267 Political circumstances in
much of Africa are closely linked to Africa’s continuing economic
troubles.268
C.

Constructing New African Infrastructures

Although the importance of good governance and institutional
frameworks is generally acknowledged,269 such frameworks may be
treated as a black box.270 Consideration of institutional structures under264. Pierre Englebert, Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy, 28 WORLD DEV.
1821, 1822 (2000).
265. Robin Grief, Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth, 98 PUB. CHOICE 317,
326– 28 (1999) (noting that former French colonies in Africa have poorer economic performance, and finding that duration of colonization and British colonization are positively correlated with education, indicating that the British left a more educated
population in Africa after colonialism).
266. Englebert, supra note 260, at 22– 23.
267. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 547, 550, 561– 62
(2005) (noting that the post-1500 economic development of Europe was facilitated by
the indirect institutional consequences of the Atlantic trade, which included the development of political institutions that limited and constrained state power, as well as direct
profits from colonization and slavery associated with this trade).
268. Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, 41
WORLD POL. 407, 409 (1989) (noting that political and economic crises in Africa are
interrelated and that a “self-perpetuating cycle of change” exists in which “weak states
engender anemic economies whose poor performance in turn further undermines the
capacity of the state apparatus”); John Ravenhill, Africa’s Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development, in AFRICA IN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1, 2 (John Ravenhill ed., 1986) (noting
that per capita incomes might fall below certain levels at the time of independence, and
the welfare gap between Africa and the rest of the world has widened).
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See Acemoglu, Colonial Origins, supra note 257, at 1395 (noting that institutions
are treated as a “black box” in their analysis). But see Oliver F. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2005) (noting that the economics of governance have helped make economists focus on the importance of institutions, and that it is
no longer acceptable to treat governance “as someone else’s bailiwick . . . to assume
transactions costs are zero,” or uncritically “to ascribe innate monopoly purposes to
nonstandard contractual practices and organizational structures”); Kenneth W. Dam,
Institutions, History and Economic Development 1 (U. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 271, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=875026 (discussing ways in
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lying markets and economic institutions has been a subject of consideration by a broad range of economists and social scientists.271
In African contexts, widespread patronialism has been a significant
impediment to economic performance in many countries.272 At least in
part as a consequence of such forces, governing powers in Africa have
tended to serve quite narrow clienteles.273 This suggests that institutions
that reflect deleterious patterns of incentives and relationships have
become imbedded in the post-colonial African context. How best to
change such institutions remains a subject of significant discussion and
comment.274
Some commentators recommend rule of law as the way with which
best to confront Africa’s authoritarian history.275 What constitutes rule of
law and how rule of law can be implemented remains a continuing question. Further, crafting new institutions on top of existing patterns of relationships with incentives that may be contrary to the goals of such new
institutions is unlikely to be successful.276 The development of functional
institutional frameworks is key to Africa’s achieving sustained economic
growth in the future.277 An institution can be defined as “a public system
of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities, and the like, [which] specify certain forms of
actions as permissible, others as forbidden.”278 An institution can be also
thought of as an abstract object or as “a possible form of conduct
expressed by a system of rules.”279
Discussions about the infrastructure deficits often focus on creating
institutional frameworks within which to accomplish stated goals.280 One
evident strategy focuses on identifying institutions in other contexts, particularly in the West, that played an important role in the development of
infrastructure.281 Recognition of the key role played by institutions in
which the developing world can attain rule of law by looking at how countries in today’s
developed world did so).
271. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989); HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2003).
272. Fatton, supra note 250, at 459.
273. Paul Collier & Jan Willem Bunning, Explaining African Economic Performance,
37 J. ECON. LIT. 64, 66 (1999) (noting that African governments have served narrow
constituencies and as a result behaved in ways damaging to the long-term interests of a
majority of their populations).
274. See, e.g., Ravenhill, supra note 268, at 1.
275. See Larry Diamond, Building a Democratic Africa, HOOVER DIG. (July 30, 1998),
http://www.hoover.org/research/building-democratic-africa (advocating a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, and devolution of power).
276. Collier & Bunning, supra note 273, at 105 (explaining that serving narrow constituencies allows governments to stay in power and disregard economic decline).
277. See id.
278. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 47– 48 (1999).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Ravenhill, supra note 268, at 1– 3.
281. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 275.
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other contexts is important.282 Further, the development of such institutions, which include educational frameworks and structures that support
the development of private sector participants, may aid African countries
in adopting institutional frameworks that can be a basis for construction of
robust infrastructures.283 Imported institutional frameworks also reflect
the sociocultural and historical contexts in which they developed, which
means that translating such institutions into new contexts is not always an
easy endeavor.284
Any consideration of the development of institutions in Africa should
give greater attention to incentives and the ways in which such incentives
should be restructured to achieve better outcomes. Examining institutions
in this light can help bring attention to three key factors: the nature of the
relationships that such institutions are intended to foster, the ways to create incentives to promote the development of desired patterns of relationships, and the potential for hybrid institutions that may incorporate
particular local configurations or combine elements of what might be distinct institutions in other contexts. Consequently, such hybrid institutions
may mediate existing dichotomies in other contexts, including in public,
private, individual, and collective contexts. Such mediation and modification may take different shapes in particular local contexts. Local contextualization may also help in the development of institutions based on
alternative templates that reflect social, political, and cultural conditions
that exist in Africa. The ultimate goal of such institutions would be to
transcend the limitations of models translated from other contexts, and to
supplement or replace approaches to existing policy initiatives.
D.

Financing Infrastructures

Chinese investment in African infrastructure projects has occurred in
many instances after persistent underinvestment in infrastructures in a
wide range of African countries and infrastructure sectors.285 In the power
sector, for example, prolonged underinvestment in new generation capacity is a significant factor in the current power crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa.286
Chinese investment cannot and should not substitute African invest282. See id.
283. See, e.g., Ravenhill, supra note 268, at 1– 3.
284. MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN
MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 224 (1995) (discussing the adoption during colonialism of African
legal systems in Malawi and Zambia based on British law); Adebambo Adewopo, The
Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Prognostic Reflection, 33 U.
TOL. L. REV. 749, 749– 50 (2002) (noting that legal structures of most African countries
reflect legal frameworks of colonial laws and legal systems).
285. See generally Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, supra note 91; supra Part I.A, C.
286. EBERHARD, supra note 123, at 12, 16 (“chronic power problems— including insufficient investment in generation capacity and networks, stagnant or declining connectivity, poor reliability, and high costs and prices (which further hinders maintenance,
refurbishment, and system expansion)— have created a power crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa”).
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ment in the development of African infrastructure.287 Existing infrastructures and institutional frameworks that have encouraged significant capital
flight have impeded investment by Africans in infrastructure and other
needed areas.288 Capital flight reflects a continuation of the external
extractive paradigm that was a key aspect of colonial policy.289 Capital
outflows from Africa deprive the continent of significant pools of financing
that could be used to finance infrastructure and other critical needs.290
Between 1970 and 2008, an estimated $854 billion to $1.8 trillion in illicit
financial flows (IFFs) left Africa.291 Growth in IFFs exceeded economic
growth figures with a growth of 11.9 percent per year over these thirty-nine
years.292 A 2015 report suggested that African countries are losing more
than $50 billion annually due to IFFs.293 An estimated eighty-two percent
of Sub-Saharan African GDP flowed outside of Africa during this time
period.294 Many of these funds have been placed in tax havens or developed countries.295 West and Central Africa accounted for $494.0 billion
(thirty-seven percent), North Africa for $415.6 billion (thirty-one percent),
and Southern Africa for $370.0 billion (twenty-seven percent), with Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa leading regional outflows.296
III. Assessing Chinese Infrastructure Deals in Africa
A.

Questions and Issues Arising from China’s African Infrastructure
Investments

Some have criticized Chinese investment activities in Africa as potentially exploitative on account of a perceived inattention to human rights
concerns.297 China’s need for energy and natural resources drives Chi287. See id. at 170.
288. See generally CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA: CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND POLICY ISSUES (S.
Ibi Ajayi & Léonce Ndikumana eds., 2015); LÉONCE NDIKUMANA & JAMES K. BOYCE,
AFRICA’S ODIOUS DEBTS: HOW FOREIGN LOANS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT BLED A CONTINENT
(2011).
289. See NDIKUMANA & BOYCE, supra note 288, at 55; Acemoglu, Colonial Origins,
supra note 257, at 1376 (explaining different colonization policies, such as “extractive
states”).
290. See generally NDIKUMANA & BOYCE, supra note 288 (explaining the principle of
capital flight and its impact on African countries).
291. Casey Sahadath, Illicit Financial Flows and Capital Flight in Africa, E-INT’L REL.
STUDENTS: STUDENT ESSAYS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/14/illicitfinancial-flows-and-capital-flight-in-africa/.
292. Id.
293. U.N., Econ. Comm’n for Afr., Illicit Financial Flows: Report on the High Level
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 13 (Feb. 2015), http://www.uneca.org/publications/illicit-financial-flows.
294. Id.
295. Capital Flight from Africa, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR.: MEDIA CTR. (Apr. 7,
2014), http://www.uneca.org/stories/capital-flight-africa.
296. AFR. DEV. BANK & GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS AND THE
PROBLEM OF NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS FROM AFRICA: 1980– 2009 1, 3 (2013), http://www
.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/AfricaNetResources/gfi_afdb_iffs_and_
the_problem_of_net_resource_transfers_from_africa_1980-2009-web.pdf.
297. Uche Ofodile, Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China’s Africa Policy in Perspective, 4
J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 86, 89– 90 (2009).
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nese investment in Africa to a significant degree— in 2005, for example,
thirty percent of China’s total oil imports originated in Africa.298 Critics
suggest that China’s quest for African natural resources has led to an inattention to human rights considerations, and a support of dictators and
repressive regimes.299 China’s activities have also been characterized as
undermining efforts to isolate rogue governments.300 Chinese arms sales
to Africa are also significant; for example, they constituted ten percent of
arms transfers between 1996 and 2003.301 Criticisms have been particularly acute regarding Chinese activity in Sudan, where the Darfur genocide
occurred amid significant Chinese engagement with the Sudanese government.302 Chinese activities may even contribute to the development of
rogue states.303
At least some Chinese activities may undermine the processes under
which robust institutions and infrastructures are constructed.304 Investment and other projects funded by China could be implemented in a manner to counter criticism by focusing on activities that promote development
and on the construction of sustainable infrastructures that benefit a
broader segment of the population.305 The development of such sustainable infrastructures would be consistent with the long-term nature of Chinese engagement in Africa considering the timeline of China’s
infrastructure activities and investments.306
B.

The Importance of Transactional Terms and Relationships

Although the construction of infrastructure can provide clear shortterm benefits given the widespread nature of infrastructure deficits in
Africa, the benefits of Chinese infrastructure investments for Africa may be
difficult to evaluate comprehensively in the short-term.307 The extent to
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 88– 89.
Id. at 89– 90.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
WENJIE CHEN ET AL., WHY IS CHINA INVESTING IN AFRICA? EVIDENCE AT THE FIRM
LEVEL 1, 3, 7– 8 (Aug. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2015/08/why-china-is-investing-in-africa/why-is-china-investing-in-africa.pdf
(noting that Chinese investment “is indifferent to those governance measures, with the
result that the countries where China’s investment share is large tend to be ones with
weak governance”); Roudabeh Kishi & Clionadh Raleigh, Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah
States (ACLED Working Paper, 2015), http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/ACLED_Working-Paper_Chinese-Aid-paper_final.pdf; Lee Mwiti, China Does
Not Support Rogue African States, It Creates Them— New Study Says, MAIL & GUARDIAN
AFR. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-04-07-china-does-not-supportrogue-african-states-it-creates-them-insteadnew-study.
304. Ofodile, supra note 297, at 95 (noting that “China can promote purposeful, people-centered, sustainable development in Africa”).
305. Id. at 95 (suggesting that China “refrain from undermining human rights initiatives in the continent” and “strive to play a constructive role in the renaissance of Africa,
not undermine it”).
306. See id. at 87, 95 (explaining China’s Africa policy as “a view to promoting the
steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term”).
307. See SUN, supra note 18, at 30.
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which a significant long-term benefit is realized within Africa will depend
to a large degree on the terms and conditions by which Chinese-funded
infrastructure projects are undertaken. It will also depend on the extent to
which African countries learn from such projects and the degree to which
such learning extends beyond the provision of unconnected pieces of physical infrastructure.308 Infrastructure deficits encompass more than a
dearth of physical structures, but also reflect deficiencies in critical intangible elements; these may include an insufficient management of available
resources, failures in provision of related services, and inadequate legal
and regulatory frameworks.309 Simply constructing new physical structures cannot fill such gaps. Filling such gaps will require the development
of logistical, management, business, legal, and regulatory services and
institutions that will enable maintenance and reconstruction of infrastructures developed or funded by China.310
As a result, key questions to be considered in assessing the potential
impact of Chinese investment and activities in Africa include: the extent to
which the need for infrastructure networks are recognized, economic and
other transactional terms, the extent to which capacity building is incorporated in project planning and implementation, how infrastructure projects
are to be managed during the construction and post-construction phases,
the quality of infrastructure projects being managed, the extent to which
transactional terms are benchmarked against global standards (both in
financial terms and construction standards), the negotiation processes
connected to the infrastructure project, and the extent to which principals
on the African side have the capacity and experience to negotiate the proposed project.311 Finally, despite the fact that Chinese-funded projects
may have a concessionary element, the amount of debt being undertaken
in connection with such projects will play a role in project success.312
The construction of the TAZARA railway between Zambia and
Tanzania, which was completed in the mid-1970s, may give some indication of the ways in which Chinese infrastructure projects may or may not
resemble infrastructure financing by other external powers.313 The railway, which enabled land-locked Zambia to avoid shipping copper through
white-ruled Southern Rhodesia,314 reflected a somewhat different development vision rooted in a vision of African regionalism espoused by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia.315 Although Tanzania and Zambia sought financing from Western sources and the World Bank, their requests were denied. Their
308. Id.
309. Id. at 95.
310. See id. at 30.
311. See Mark Bohlund & Tom Orlik, China’s Road to Africa Lifts Investment, Adds
Debt Risk, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL (June 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/chinas-road-to-africa-lifts-investment-adds-debt-risk/.
312. See MONSON, supra note 52, at 1– 2.
313. See id. at 2.
314. See id.
315. Id. at 15, 21.
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requests were denied because these funding sources thought the project
was based on a political, rather than economic, rationale.316
China, which sought to counter Soviet and American influences in
Africa, initiated the project and undertook what was at the time the third
largest infrastructure project in Africa.317 China’s funding of the TAZARA
railway reflected China’s “Eight Principles of Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance,”318 which “were designed to [allow China to] compete simultaneously with the ‘imperialists’ (the United States) and the
‘revisionists’ (the Soviet Union) for Africa’s approval and support . . . .
China used its foreign aid to Africa as an instrument to advance China’s
political interests.”319
China offered generous terms of credit for the railway.320 The construction process included attention to the creation of knowledgeable local
employees through worker training that focused on “teaching by example,”
which led to the creation of a “cohort of experienced African railway specialists who continued to work until retirement.”321 At the same time, the
construction of TAZARA bore significant resemblance to earlier projects by
European colonial powers.322 For example, China provided rolling stock
(rail cars), locomotives, steel rails, signaling equipment, and other materials, although cement sleepers and poles were produced in workshops in
Tanzania.323 China provided engineering and construction expertise, and
an estimated 15,000 to 50,000 workers during the project.324 In the end,
construction of TAZARA led to more limited self-reliance, skills development, and training than anticipated, which have been a factor in continuing
TAZARA performance difficulties since the time of its construction.325
Patterns of interaction between Africans and Chinese during the
TAZARA project have continuing relevance today. Significant segregation
existed in TAZARA work camps, as well as a perception that Chinese workers were reluctant to interact with Africans.326 The reluctance of Chinese
workers in Africa to interact with Africans continues to be an issue of concern in a number of countries and has been a source of continuing contro316. Id. at 6.
317. Id. at 2, 26– 29.
318. Strauss, supra note 18, at 786 (noting that the eight principles include “China’s
commitment to equality and mutual benefit to help the economies of friendly emerging
countries, strictly respecting sovereignty, training the personnel of the host country to
master the new equipment, and perhaps most of all, directing the Chinese technicians
sent to Africa to have only the same standard of living as experts in the host country”);
Zhou Enlai Announced Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 13, 2010), http:/
/www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm. See MONSON,
supra note 52, at 29.
319. SUN, supra note 18, at 4.
320. MONSON, supra note 52, at 30.
321. Id. at 9.
322. Id. at 16– 17.
323. Id. at 32.
324. Id. at 32– 33 (noting that 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese teams worked on the project
during the intensive construction years between 1970 and 1974).
325. Id. at 100– 06.
326. Id. at 56– 64, 150.
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versy, which is not surprising in light of racial bars and other exclusionary
racial practices that were characteristic features of European colonialism in
many countries.327
Past experience with external powers suggests that attention must be
paid to the terms and manners of engagement with any infrastructure construction project. To be truly transformative, such projects must transform
the broader environment surrounding the infrastructure project, not just
build a physical object. Without attention to this wider environment, in the
absence of broader local transformation, Chinese constructed infrastructure projects will likely deteriorate in the same manner as earlier European
ones.
C.

Constructing Relationships with External Powers: The Importance of
Transparency

Some commentators express concern that Chinese infrastructure and
other investment activities in Africa will “perpetuate endemic public corruption.”328 Although China has taken steps that suggest that it may assist
in fighting corruption within Africa,329 Chinese companies have faced allegations of corruption related to contracts awards in a number of countries
in Africa.330 Public disclosure of the nature and terms of activities of Chinese and other investors in Africa could greatly facilitate transparency.
Such transparency may help minimize opportunities for corruption in connection with large-scale infrastructure projects. The type of secrecy surrounding China’s recent MOU with the African Union and other
infrastructure projects does not contribute to an environment of greater
transparency.331 Greater transparency in infrastructure projects may
assist in providing an environment in which sustained and robust infra327. See Murithi Mutiga, ‘No Africans’ Chinese restaurant owner arrested in Nairobi,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/noafricans-restaurant-owner-arrested-nairobi-kenya (discussing the arrest of the owner of a
Chinese restaurant in Nairobi that had a “no Africans policy” following a social media
furor and the emergence of the Twitter hashtag #noblacksallowed); Chi-Yu Shih, Harmonious Racism: China’s Civilizational Soft Power in Africa, THE FOCUS: AFRICA AND THE CHINESE WAY (The Newsletter), Summer 2012, at 28 (noting that “lofty policy concessions
and aid, as well as normative support for autonomy, are not sufficient to soothe Chinese
racism toward Black people. In fact, almost 70% of respondents rank Africans lowest in
social status in a survey.”). See also James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, in PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICA: A READER IN CULTURE, HISTORY AND REPRESENTATION 595, 601 (Roy
Richard Grinker & Stephen C. Lubkemann eds., 2010) (discussing the color bar in colonial Africa).
328. Jennifer Whitman, Fighting the Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa with
Supply-Side Anti-Bribery Laws: The Role of China, 11 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 121,
122 (2014).
329. Id. at 125.
330. Michael Malakata, Telecom Deals with Chinese Companies in Africa under Spotlight
Once Again, PCWORLD (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2983210/
telecom-deals-with-chinese-companies-in-africa-under-spotlight-once-again.html.
331. Eric Olander, China’s Mystery Deal with the African Union, THE CHINA AFR. PROJECT (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/podcast-china-african-union-aumou-transportation/.
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structure and institutional development might take place.332
Conclusion
Africa is potentially poised for significant future economic growth.
Given likely future population increases, ensuring that new infrastructure
projects are truly transformative will be a key element in actual realization
of rosy economic predictions. In the case of infrastructure projects, such
transformation will require attention to the wider environment surrounding infrastructure projects; transformation will also require taking steps to
assure that such projects can be a basis for knowledge transfer, development of capacity, and a starting point for future projects that can be at least
in part conceived, constructed, and maintained locally. By taking such
steps, new infrastructure projects reflecting a vision of sustainability and
recreation can be a basis for African transformation rather than a repetition of past failures.

332. Similar concerns about transparency have been raised in relation to a 2015
cyber-security agreement between South Africa and China. Charlie Fripp, DA Concerned
Over Cyber Security Deal with China, HTXT.AFRICA (June 10, 2015), http://www
.htxt.co.za/2015/06/10/da-concerned-over-cyber-security-deal-with-china/.
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